INTRODUCTION
This article deals with the links between the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the implications of their developments in the context of Libya and Syria. R2P is a consolidating norm in international society that takes account of the fact that states have a responsibility towards human beings in times of crises. Both concepts focus on the idea that sovereignty has evolved from being an absolute right towards sovereignty including responsibility towards a state's own citizens. The primary responsibility to protect a state's citizens lies with the state itself but should that state be unwilling or unable to do so, then the international community needs to step in and take on that responsibility. This idea has developed over the years and is institutionalised in R2P through a three pillar structure and similarly in the ICC through the principle of complementarity. The idea was applied in the case of Libya where military as well as judicial intervention was supported by R2P language.
Following criticisms over NATO's involvement in Libya and the civilian protection mandate that eventually resulted in regime change, a number of states became less supportive of R2P.
Subsequent vetoes in the Security Council on resolutions that would have supported intervention in the Syrian crisis were based more on principle rather than substantive disagreements about the crisis itself. China and Russia in particular (but not exclusively) opposed invoking R2P as a smokescreen to legitimise regime change. This has also affected the ICC's ability to intervene in the conflict with judicial means. This article argues that for this and a number of other reasons, the ICC does not benefit from being too closely associated with R2P and military intervention. It is not a powerful mechanism for stopping ongoing violence and it risks becoming too much of a political tool, harmed by geopolitical struggles in the Security Council.
The principles of ending impunity and holding individuals accountable for their actions are not questioned by the international society, a clear Responsibility to Prosecute seems to exist, but the question is how this can be done in a politically sustainable way. Security Council referral doesn't seem to be the best option for this. Too close ties with the Council will lead to the ICC becoming a politicised tool, moving further away from what it was designed to do -to be instrument for universal and impartial enforcement of justice principles.
II. THE ICC AND R2P
Intervention in other state's affairs to protect human rights has been discussed in international relations for a long time. Predominantly centred on controversies surrounding humanitarian intervention, i.e. the intervention with military force to protect human rights in another state, the international community was trying to establish guidelines to ensure consistent application. As has been well documented elsewhere, in 2000, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) acknowledged that external military intervention for human protection purposes has been controversial both when it happenedas in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo -and when it failed to happen, as in Rwanda. It tried to deal with some of these issues and also proposed establishing criteria for intervention in another state's internal affairs that go beyond mere use of force.
The 'responsibility to protect' is the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophes, such as mass murder, rape, starvation.
Sovereignty is not just a right, but it also carries obligations such as a primary responsibility towards the state's own citizens
R2P in Practice
The question is how well this works in practice. The ICISS report was written just before September 11, 2001 and the situation has changed considerably. States are very reluctant to intervene in another state's internal affairs and the main emphasis has shifted towards counterterrorism rather than concerns for human rights as a whole. Even though the ICISS report enjoys widespread support in general by civil society, different UN institutions and a number of governments, there are problems with the report's implementation. There is a lack of operational capacity and the political will of parties that would have the capacities to intervene. There was always concern that the ICISS report could be used as an excuse to legitimate any form of intervention even if the motives are not humanitarian in nature. The intervention in Libya (discussed below) can be seen as a case in point where the protection of civilians turned to regime change. However, the situation in Darfur shows the other extreme:
it is a textbook example of a government that is 'unable or unwilling' (R2P language) to protect its citizens, but the international response has been rather weak.
R2P has no legal significance as it is not legally binding in international law. As GarwoodGowers argues, R2P presents a "political or moral commitment by states" 1 to establish existing duties. R2P is a normative concept that confers powers to international institutions. It is a norm in the process of consolidating that is no longer questioned in content; the main disagreements surround questions of means, of how R2P can be implemented. The doctrine's normative language functions as political tool with the aim of changing behaviour. As
Chesterman argues, "the true significance of RtoP is not creating new rights or obligations to do "the right thing"; rather, it is making harder to do the wrong thing or nothing at all." 
R2P and ICC -linkages and parallels
The ICC is linked to and has parallels with R2P in a number of ways. In the SecretaryGeneral's 2009 'Implementing the Responsibility to Protect' report, the ICC is mentioned under pillar 1: "the responsibilities to protect, first and foremost, is a matter of State responsibility, because prevention begins at home and the protection of populations is a defining attribute of sovereignty and statehood in the twenty-first century." The aim is to "build responsible sovereignty, not undermine it." 3 In order to assist states in being able to protect human rights within their borders, the report suggests that -as a first step -states should become part of international institutions that deal with human rights and humanitarian Both, R2P and the ICC Statute share a number of key assumptions and provisions. Both call for human rights and humanitarian concerns to be of international concern and make clear moral cases in favour of a responsibility of the international community to hold those responsible for atrocities to account. They both limit their scope to only a few crimes that are seen to be of utmost concern to humanity as a whole: war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. For both, the main question remains to be the one of the means -how can R2P places its greatest emphasis on prevention as the key strategy to avoid humanitarian disasters from taking place. Similarly, the ICC focusses on its possible deterrence effect of criminal prosecutions, i.e. the notion that holding individuals accountable for their actions sends a clear signal and therefore prevents future crimes from happening.
The Security Council can refer situations to the ICC under its Chapter VII powers. Even though the rationale for using the ICC as a 'standing court' rather than having to create new ad hoc ones is compelling for a number of practical reasons, this is also very problematic because it politicises the ICC that is then perceived to be an extension of the Security Council. The ICC was intended to be largely independent from the UN and the Security
Council, but if it is being used as a tool by an inherently political body such as the Security Council, this perception of independence is being lost which ultimately undermines the Court's credibility and legitimacy.
The main difference between the two is that R2P is a political concept whereas the ICC is a legal institution. This mismatch makes linking the two problematic -especially for the ICC. , 2011, p. 263) . This was also the first time the concept of the "responsibility to protect" was used by various UN agencies and the Security Council to condemn Gaddafi and impose a no-fly zone over his country. These references to R2P
have been overemphasised by some authors, 9 but they are nevertheless existent. It was the first time the international community explicitly used R2P as a concept to intervene in a conflict, with both Security Council resolutions making references to R2P.
3.1.Referral to the ICC: Resolution 1970
Resolution 1970 was adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 26 February 2011. The
Resolution was ground-breaking in that it referred the situation in Libya to the ICC unanimously and with reference to R2P. It stated that the Libyan authorities had a "responsibility to protect its population" and that states had a responsibility to intervene should Libya fail to do so. States in the Security Council reiterated their disapproval of the Libyan authorities using force against its own population. It was argued that "the widespread 9 As argued for instance by Justin Morris 'Libya and Syria: R2P and the spectre of the swinging pendulum' (2013) 89 International Affairs and systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity."
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It is interesting to note that the Resolution was passed in the midst of an ongoing conflict, attempting to utilise the Court as a tool to end the fighting. There was a strong emphasis on the ICC's deterrence effect and attempts to utilise the Court to stop the crisis. India, for instance, referred to this by arguing that "we note that several members of the Council, including our colleagues from Africa and the Middle East, believe that referral to the Court would have the effect of an immediate cessation of violence and the restoration of calm and stability." 11 During this crisis, the ICC was seen as an instrument to achieve peace by dispensing justice in the crisis situation.
States in the Security Council emphasised the need for accountability and linked it to state leaders' responsibilities towards their own citizens. The US, for instance, argued that "Libya's leaders will be held accountable for violating these rights and for failing to meet their most basic responsibilities to their people." 12 And France similarly reiterated the importance of the ICC in this endeavour: "Today, faced with the atrocities we have seen, impunity is no longer an option. opposed such an exemption, arguing that "initiatives aimed at establishing exemptions of certain categories of individuals from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court are not helpful to advancing the cause of justice and accountability and will not contribute to strengthening the role of the Court." 14 As will be argued below, such exemptions are harmful to the institutional setup of the ICC as they go against the Court's aim to provide impartial justice that is fair to all.
Crucially, Resolution 1970 also included a paragraph that expressed the readiness of the Security Council to take further appropriate steps should Libya not comply with the terms of the resolution, paving the way for Resolution 1973.
3.2.Civilian Protection: Resolution 1973
Resolution 1973 14 Ibid.
The Resolution authorised the Security Council to take 'all necessary measures' to protect civilians and also to impose no-fly zones that could be enforced by NATO. The Resolution again used R2P language by reiterating the notion that it was Libya's primary responsibility to protect its own people. This was the first time R2P language was used to actually condemn Gaddafi and impose a no-fly zone over his country. In statements following the vote, a number of states referred to Libya's responsibility towards its own people. Even though a number of states argued that "Libya was not fulfilling the "international responsibility of protecting its population," 15 the Council was divided on a number of issues with respect to Resolution 1973. Abstaining members pointed out that they were not opposed to taking action per se, but that they did not agree that using military force should be part of the Resolution. In the statement following the vote, Germany argued that they saw great risks in using military force: "If the steps proposed turn out to be ineffective, we see the danger of being drawn into a protracted military conflict that would affect the wider region."
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Similarly, Brazil was critical of the means that were employed to ensure the protection of the Libyan people. They argued that even though they were supportive of the Arab League's call for "strong measures to stop the violence through a no-fly zone", (… The intervention in Libya was ground-breaking on a number of levels, but it also highlighted a number of problems with R2P in practice. The intervention was done with the primary aim to protect civilians and to stop massive human rights abuses from taking place. This changed, however, when NATO started expanding the targets it attacked in order to force Gaddafi out of power. This aim of regime change -that was seen by NATO leaders as necessary for achieving its aim of protecting civilians -became a major bone of contention and led to Libya being seen as the negative example of 'how not to do it'. A number of states that had been hesitant about the military intervention in the first place, argued that NATO had overstepped its mark and that R2P had been used a smokescreen for regime change. Bashar al-Assad, launched a violent crackdown on peaceful protestors after a group of children were arrested, detained and tortured because of painting anti-government graffiti on public buildings. Protests spread rapidly across the whole country and the reaction of the military forces became even more violent. According to the UN, more than 100,000 people have lost their lives to date and more than 6 million had to flee their homes. Throughout the uprising, the Syrian government has referred to the opposition as terrorists that are trying to destabilize the country. Opposition leaders counter that that was just the regime's way of justifying their attacks against civilians.
Initial enthusiasm regarding the application of R2P and that the concept could be invoked in cases of serious human rights abuses were dampened with the onset of this crisis. Syria has been subject to Security Council debates a number of times and it is clear that the Security Council is at a deadlock due to a number of reasons. What we lack is a means by which to achieve justice and accountability. In resolution 2139, the Security Council unanimously stressed the need to end impunity for violations of international law and reaffirmed "that those who have committed or are otherwise responsible for such violations and abuses in Syria must be brought to justice." It is for the Security Council to make this pursuit of justice possible."
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There are clear division between Council members on the tension between peace and justice in this context. Some argue that justice should not be pursued if peace has not been established in Syria and that pursuing justice would actually harm the peace process. Other say that the two go hand in hand and that justice is a first step towards peace. And even others argue that because there is no peace process in Syria, it cannot be harmed by pursuing justice.
These divisions also became evident during the debates following another draft resolution on Syria on 22 May 2014. Sixty-five states submitted a resolution to the Security Council, proposing to refer the situation of Syria to the ICC. The resolution was (not surprisingly)
vetoed by Russia and China that were both concerned about the possibility of using such a resolution as pretext for armed intervention with the ultimate aim of regime change. Any possible ICC action is dependent on state cooperation which includes the apprehension of suspects, by force if necessary. Russia stood firm in its view that peace had to come before justice and also that the Libyan example had shown that referrals to the ICC "did not help resolve the crisis, but instead added fuel to the flames of the conflict." 34 Russia argued that Syrians themselves were responsible for settling the crisis and that the Geneva Communique continued to remain at the core of peace efforts. China was similarly concerned that ICC The draft resolution contained a number of references to R2P, such as Australia's statement that "The Security Council has a responsibility to protect, a responsibility mandated by all our leaders at their World Summit in 2005, and to prevent mass atrocities where we can."
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Furthermore, "The Council's roles was specifically recognized in the Rome Statute, because accountability is central to protection and to the Council's fundamental responsibilities relating to the maintenance of international peace and security." Australia favours justice before peace, but also argued that the two are inextricably linked. Rwanda similarly stated that the Security Council's responsibility for international peace and security "includes the responsibility to protect and the obligation of (sic) hold accountable the perpetrators of the most serious crimes." 
Selective justice
Even though a great number of states decided to vote in favour of the 22 May resolution, the draft was not without its critics. Criticisms related to the way the resolution exempted nonstates parties from the ICC's jurisdiction, thereby applying a very selective approach to what should be impartial and equal justice. This again shows the difficulties and problems attached to the ICC being used as a political tool by the Security Council. Such selectivity might be politically necessary to gather enough support for the resolution, but it is detrimental to the ICC's perceived impartiality and legitimacy. These kinds of exemptions seem to become 35 Ibid. 14 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid.
common norm in Security Council referrals as the resolutions that referred the situations in Darfur and Libya similarly exclude all non-states parties except the ones in question. It is clear that such selectivity is problematic for the ICC that aims to be an impartial and fair body. 38 This point was also made by a number of states following debates after the vote on the 22 May resolution. First and foremost, Argentina made a number of critical arguments against such selectivity, arguing that this harms the ICC: "Argentina decided not to be a sponsor of the initiative, because it was also our objective to preserve the integrity of the Statute, which requires referrals to the Council to be formulated in the appropriate terms so as not to undermine the legal foundations of the Rome Statute itself or the Court's validity and 
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ICC AND ITS LEGITIMACY STATUS
There are two main issues that are worth highlighting in the context of the present analysis.
The first relates to the nature of criminal justice more generally -i.e. the pursuit of international justice during an ongoing conflict and the second to the relationship between the ICC and the Security Council -i.e. the use of the ICC as a political tool.
The Nature of Criminal Justice
The first issue related to ICC action in the midst of an ongoing conflict is a more general one that lies in the nature of criminal justice itself. There has been an overall shift in R2P's focus: it was primarily meant to be a humanitarian doctrine, focussing on the prevention of human rights abuses, but it has become more of a conflict resolution tool. R2P is present-looking or prospective, the ICC on the other hand is 
Relationship between the ICC and the Security Council
The second issue that the Libya and Syria conflicts clearly highlight is the fact that the ICC can be (and is being) used as a political tool in the Security Council. It is generally agreed that the ICC is part of the toolkit when considering action under the R2P umbrella, but: this politicises the ICC which is -at least on paper -meant to be an impartial and neutral body and it becomes an extension of the Security Council which is by its very nature a deeply political body. Being linked to R2P in Security Council deliberations can be detrimental to the ICC's perceived legitimacy as the R2P concept in itself has become controversial after Prosecute is not in question, but that it still needs to be decided how it can be done. China and Russia did not veto these resolutions and it is therefore clear that agreement exists between states in the international society that these kind of crimes that are taking place cannot go unpunished. The difference lies in the approach of how to achieve justice -Russia and China have historically been against interventionist politics and emphasise state sovereignty and the state's own responsibility to act.
Using the ICC as a tool at the disposal of the Security Council as a political body raises the question of the context in which ICC has been given jurisdiction. The Security Council has the right (within existing UN Charter provisions) to determine a threat to international peace and security and decide on appropriate action, but this is a political decision, not a judicial one. The ICC was intended to be largely independent from the UN and the Security Council, but if it is being used as a tool by the Security Council, this perception of independence is lost and it ultimately undermines the Court's credibility and legitimacy.
In addition, the fact that the adopted Security Council resolutions exempt non-states parties from the Court's jurisdiction is very problematic for the selectivity these resolutions exercise.
As Louise Arbour 49 rightly argues, referrals in the cases of Libya and Darfur have done little to enhance the standing and credibility of the Court and have also contributed very little to peace and reconciliation in the countries. She argues that even though such referrals enhance the reach of accountability, they do so at a cost that is very difficult to bear for an international justice mechanism. Such selectivity jeopardises one of the rule of laws basic premises of 'equality before the law'. As Christian Wenaweser, 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The ICC is more than just a tool for the Security Council, however, and being side-lined by the UN does not mean that it is becoming less important in its overall endeavour. As could be seen from the recent crisis in the Ukraine, where the state accepted ICC jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis, the ICC is very much alive and kicking. It still has other obstacles it needs to deal with and overcome (such as the recent AU 'backlash' against the ICC). Too close ties with the Security Council are not desirable for the ICC because politicisation leads the ICC away from its initial aim: that of impartial justice.
The ICC can benefit from being associated with R2P especially when it comes to the first priority of 'prevention'. Holding individuals to account for crimes is designed to have a 51 David Bosco 172 deterrence effect, preventing future crimes from happening. This association is becoming less beneficial, however, if it is then linked to military intervention based on Chapter VII action.
The ICC needs assistance from states for its enforcement -with force if necessary -which again highlights problems attached to the Security Council referring cases. The basic principle of a Responsibility to Prosecute is not challenged -the question is one of how, not whether and it is becoming increasingly clear that Security Council referral is not the best way forward.
